THE BATTLE OF BANNOCKBURN PART III

  Since his landing at Ayrshire in 1307, King Robert had demonstrated time and time again that he was willing to take risks, but these were always measured and calculated. He had no intention of chancing all on the outcome of a day, as had William Wallace at the Battle of Falkirk. Almost to the last minute, he was prepared to withdraw.

The Chronicle of Lanercost seems to confirm that the English also believed he would seek to retreat as it states that " . . . the king’s [Edward's] advanced guard, commanded by Lord de Clifford, began to make a circuit of the wood to prevent the Scots escaping by flight". King Robert was persuaded to remain by news of the poor state of morale in the English army. But undoubtedly the most important factor in persuading him to make a stand was the ground before him. 

The Bannockburn, over which the English army had to cross on the way to Stirling, and its sister streams flowed over the Carse of Stirling. A carse is an area which is wet in winter, but hard in summer, and most of it was used for growing wheat, oats, and barley.

With the trees of the New Park covering Bruce's army to the west, the only approach apart from the Pows to the east was directly over the old road from Falkirk. If this route, virtually the only solid ground on which heavy cavalry could be effectively deployed, were to be denied to the English, they would have no choice but to wheel right to the northeast, on to the Carse.

  To force Edward to take this route, Bruce adopted tactics similar to those he had used at the Battle of Loudon Hill: both sides of the road were peppered with small pits or 'pots', each three feet deep and covered with brush, which would force the enemy to bunch towards the centre of a dangerously constricted front.

Once on the Carse, the English army would be caught in a kind of natural vise, as the main action on 24 June showed, with waterways to the north, east, and south. Such natural advantages were not easily obtained, and were unlikely to occur again. There is some confusion over the exact site of the Battle of Bannockburn, although most modern historians agree that the traditional site, where a visitor center and statue have been erected, is not the correct one.

Although a large number of possible alternatives have been proposed, most can be dismissed and two serious contenders can be considered:   the area of peaty ground known as the Dryfield outside the village of Balquhiderock, about three-quarters of a mile to the east of the traditional site and  the Carse of Balquhiderock, about a mile and a half northeast of the traditional site, accepted by the National Trust as the most likely candidate.

It was on the old road that the preliminary actions of the Battle of Bannockburn took place on Sunday, 23 June. For the English, things started to go wrong before the first blow had been struck. Sir Philip Mowbray, the commander of Stirling Castle, who had observed Bruce's preparations on the road, appeared in Edward's camp early in the morning, and warned of the dangers of approaching the Scots directly through the New Park.  Mowbray also pointed out that there was no need to force a battle, as Edward was now close enough to the castle to constitute a technical relief in terms of the agreement with Edward Bruce.

But even if the king was disposed to act on Mowbray's advice, it was already too late; for he was showing signs of losing control of his formidable but unwieldy host.

 The vanguard under the earls of Gloucester and Hereford, appointed to joint command by Edward after a quarrel about who would take the lead a compromise that satisfied no one — were already closing in on the Scots from the south, advancing in the same reckless manner that had almost brought disaster at Falkirk.

Following the line of the Roman road, they crossed the ford over the Bannockburn towards King Robert's division at the opening of the New Park.  There now occurred one of the most memorable episodes in Scottish history.

Henry de Bohun, nephew of the Earl of Hereford, was riding ahead of his companions when he caught sight of the Scottish king. De Bohun lowered his lance and began a charge that carried him to lasting fame. King Robert was mounted on a small palfrey and armed only with a battle-axe. He had no armor on.

As de Bohun's great war-horse thundered towards him, he stood his ground, watched with mounting anxiety by his own army. With the Englishman only feet away, Bruce turned aside, stood in his stirrups and hit the knight so hard with his axe that he split his helmet and head in two. This small incident became in a larger sense a symbol of the war itself: the one side heavily armed but lacking agility; the other highly mobile and open to opportunity.

Rebuked by his commanders for the enormous risk he had taken, the king only expressed regret that he had broken the shaft of his axe.  Cheered by this heroic encounter, Bruce's division rushed forward to engage the main enemy force. For the English, so says the author of the Vita Edward Secundi (Life of Edward II), this was the beginning of their troubles.

After some fierce fighting, in which the Earl of Gloucester was knocked off his horse, the knights of the vanguard were forced to retreat to the Tor Wood. The Scots, eager to pursue, were held back by the command of the king.  In the meantime, another English cavalry force under Robert Clifford and Henry de Beaumont skirted the Scottish position to the east and rode towards Stirling, advancing as far as St. Ninians.

Bruce spotted the maneuver and ordered Randolph's schiltron to intercept.  Randolph's action was a foretaste of the main contest the following day: unsupported by archers, the horsemen were unable to make any impression on the Scots spearmen, precisely what had happened in the opening stages of Falkirk. The difference now was that the Schiltrons had learned mobility and how to keep formation at the same time. The English squadron was broken, some seeking refuge in the nearby castle, others fleeing back to the army. The captives included Sir Thomas Gray, whose son and namesake later based his account of the Battle of Bannockburn in his book, the Scalacronica, on his father's memories 

The English army was still approaching Stirling from the south. Bruce's preparations had made the direct approach to Stirling too hazardous. Edward made the worst decision of all: he ordered the army to cross the Bannockburn to the east of the New Park.

  Not long after daybreak on 24 June, the Scots spearmen began to move towards the English. Edward was surprised to see Robert's army emerge from the cover of the woods. As Bruce's army drew nearer, they paused and knelt in prayer.

Edward is supposed to have said in surprise "They pray for mercy!" "For mercy, yes," one of his attendants replied, "But from God, not you. These men will conquer or die."  One of the English earls, Gloucester, asked the king to hurry up, but the king accused him of cowardice. Angered, the earl mounted his horse and led the vanguard on a charge against the leading Scots spearmen, commanded by Edward Bruce.

Gloucester, who according to some accounts had not bothered to don his surcoat, was killed in the forest of Scottish spears, along with some of the other knights. The very size and strength of the great army was beginning to work against the English king, as his army could not move quickly and lost a lot of time in getting into position.

  Bruce then committed his whole Scots army to an inexorable bloody push into the disorganized English mass, fighting side by side across a single front. Edward's army was now so tightly packed that if a man fell, he risked being immediately crushed underfoot or suffocated and the English and Welsh longbowmen failed to get a clear shot in fear they might hit their own men.

After some time they moved to the side of Douglas's division and began shooting into its left, but upon the command of Robert the Bruce who oversaw this Scottish 500-horse light cavalry under Robert Keith dispersed them. The returning fleeing archers then caused the infantry itself to begin to flee. Later the knights began to escape back across the Bannockburn.   With the English formations beginning to break, a great shout went up from the Scots, "Lay on! Lay on! Lay on! They fail!"

This cry was heard by Bruce's camp followers, who promptly gathered weapons and banners and charged forward. To the English army, close to exhaustion, this appeared to be a fresh reserve and they lost all hope. The English forces north of the Bannockburn broke into flight. Some tried to cross the River Forth where most drowned in the attempt. Others tried to get back across the Bannockburn, but as they ran, “tumbling one over the other” down the steep, slippery banks, a deadly crush ensued so that “men could pass dryshod upon the drowned bodies”.

Edward fled with his personal bodyguard, ending the remaining order in the army; panic spread and defeat turned into a rout. He arrived eventually at Dunbar Castle, from here he took ship to England. From the carnage of Bannockburn, the rest of the army tried to escape to the safety of the English border, ninety miles to the south.

Many were killed by the pursuing Scottish army or by the inhabitants of the countryside that they passed through. Historian Peter Reese says that, "only one sizeable group of men—all footsoldiers—made good their escape to England." These were a force of Welsh spearmen who were kept together by their commander, Sir Maurice de Berkeley, and the majority of them reached Carlisle.

Weighing up the available evidence, Reese concludes that "it seems doubtful if even a third of the footsoldiers returned to England." Out of 16,000 infantrymen, this would give a total of about 11,000 killed. The English chronicler Thomas Walsingham gave the number of English men-at-arms who were killed as 700, while 500 more men-at-arms were spared for ransom.

The Scottish losses appear to have been comparatively light, with only two knights among those killed.