Battle of Bannockburn Part II

  Since his landing at Ayrshire in 1307, King Robert had demonstrated time and time again that he was willing to take risks, but these were always measured and calculated. He had no intention of risking all on the outcome of a day, as had William Wallace at the Battle of Falkirk.

   Almost to the last minute, he was prepared to withdraw. The Chronicle of Lanercost seems to confirm that the English also believed he would seek to retreat as it states that " . . . the king’s [Edward's] advanced guard, commanded by Lord de Clifford, began to make a circuit of the wood to prevent the Scots escaping by flight".

  King Robert was persuaded to remain by news of the poor state of morale in the English army. But undoubtedly the most important factor in persuading him to make a stand was the ground before him.

  The Bannockburn, over which the English army had to cross on the way to Stirling, and its sister streams flowed over the Carse of Stirling. A carse is an area which is wet in winter, but hard in summer, and most of it was used for growing wheat, oats, and barley.

  With the trees of the New Park covering Bruce's army to the west, the only approach apart from the Pows to the east was directly over the old road from Falkirk.

  If this route, virtually the only solid ground on which heavy cavalry could be effectively deployed, were to be denied to the English, they would have no choice but to wheel right to the north-east, on to the Carse.

   To force Edward to take this route, Bruce adopted tactics similar to those he had used at the Battle of Loudon Hill: both sides of the road were peppered with small pits or 'pots', each three feet deep and covered with brush, which would force the enemy to bunch towards the center of a dangerously constricted front.

   Once on the Carse, the English army would be caught in a kind of natural vise, as the main action on 24 June showed, with waterways to the north, east, and south.

   Such natural advantages were not easily obtained, and were unlikely to occur again. There is some confusion over the exact site of the Battle of Bannockburn, although most modern historians agree that the traditional site, where a visitor center and statue have been erected, is not the correct one.

  Although a large number of possible alternatives have been proposed, most can be dismissed and two serious contenders can be considered: the area of peaty ground known as the Dryfield outside the village of Balquhiderock, about three-quarters of a mile to the east of the traditional site  and  the Carse of Balquhiderock, about a mile and a half north-east of the traditional site, accepted by the National Trust as the most likely candidate.

  It was on the old road that the preliminary actions of the Battle of Bannockburn took place on Sunday, 23 June. For the English, things started to go wrong before the first blow had been struck.

   Sir Philip Mowbray, the commander of Stirling Castle, who had observed Bruce's preparation on the road, appeared in Edward's camp early in the morning, and warned of the dangers of approaching the Scots directly through the New Park.

  Mowbray also pointed out that there was no need to force a battle, as Edward was now close enough to the castle to constitute a technical relief in terms of the agreement with Edward Bruce.

  But even if the king was disposed to act on Mowbray's advice, it was already too late; for he was showing signs of losing control of his formidable but unwieldy host.

  The vanguard under the earls of Gloucester and Hereford, appointed to joint command by Edward after a quarrel about who would take the lead — a compromise that satisfied no one — were already closing in on the Scots from the south, advancing in the same reckless manner that had almost brought disaster at Falkirk.

  Following the line of the Roman road, they crossed the ford over the Bannockburn towards King Robert's division at the opening of the New Park.

  There now occurred one of the most memorable episodes in Scottish history. Henry de Bohun, nephew of the Earl of Hereford, was riding ahead of his companions when he caught sight of the Scottish king.

  De Bohun lowered his lance and began a charge that carried him to lasting fame. King Robert was mounted on a small palfrey and armed only with a battle-axe. He had no armor on.

  As de Bohun's great war-horse thundered towards him, he stood his ground, watched with mounting anxiety by his own army. With the Englishman only feet away, Bruce turned aside, stood in his stirrups and hit the knight so hard with his axe that he split his helmet and head in two.

  This small incident became in a larger sense a symbol of the war itself: the one side heavily armed but lacking agility; the other highly mobile and open to opportunity. Rebuked by his commanders for the enormous risk he had taken, the king only expressed regret that he had broken the shaft of his axe. 

                            To be Continued